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Abstract
The need for secure communication in the presence of an adversary introduced the
field of cryptology – the practice and study of techniques for secure communication.
A common method to secure communication is to distribute a secret key among
authorized parties so they can encrypt and decrypt messages between each other.
By doing so, ideally, any messages intercepted by a third party are meaningless. An
innovative technique to distribute a shared key is Quantum Key Distribution (QKD).
QKD uses laws of quantum mechanics to generate and distribute such keys. The
purpose of this thesis is to validate an existing mathematical model that is abstract
enough to model the essential characteristics of a wide range of QKD system designs.
The current model is based on a set of coupled equations. Equation coupling is
high as many output variables for a specific phase are inputs for other equations.
Because of this, the model output response function is complex, motivating the use of
experimentation and response surface modeling to characterize and understand the
relationship between inputs and outputs. The mathematical model was designed to
capture the essential details associated with a wide variety of system configurations
(i.e., designs). Surfaces representing the relationships between inputs and outputs are
plotted and used with subject matter experts (SME’s) to validate model behavior.
After validation, a genetic algorithm is used to optimize the estimated surface. Our
findings confirm the complexity of the model and indicate the presence of extreme
outliers.
Key words: model validation, design of experiments, response surface methodol–
ogy, quantum key distribution, genetic algorithm.
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A RESPONSE SURFACE VALIDATION OF A QUANTUM KEY
DISTRIBUTION MODEL
I. Introduction
1.1 Secure Communication and Cryptology
The need for secure communication arises when two or more entities wish to com–
municate without a third party “listening in” and understanding the communications.
This concern has existed in human society since the dawn of mankind. Ensuring an
unauthorized third party is not intercepting and understanding messages may be im–
possible or may require resources the authorized parties are unwilling or unable to
commit to information security; hence the need for cryptology emerged. According to
Rivest “Cryptology is about communication in the presence of adversaries” [7]. The
basic concept is the authorized parties come up with a technique to encrypt and de–
crypt messages. Encrypted messages can be sent out in the presence of unauthorized
parties as the messages are meaningless without the ability to decrypt it.
Evidence of cryptology exists throughout history. One of the earliest uses of
cryptology is the invention of a cipher. An example of a cipher comes from the ancient
Greeks. The Spartan military, used a tool called a scytale to encrypt messages during
their military campaign. As seen in Figure 1, a scytale consists of a rod with a strip
of parchment wrapped around it
The strip alone is a jumble of characters, however when wound around a rod of a
specified diameter it reveals the correct order of characters. If a message “Help me
I am under attack” needed to be sent one writes across the parchment shown more
1
Figure 1. Example scytale
clearly in Figure 2. The resulting cipher text becomes “HENTEIDTLAEAPMRC–
MUAK”.
Figure 2. Example Encryption for a scytale
As technology advanced so did cryptology moving from these simple ciphers to
complex electromechanical cipher machines. One such machine, the Enigma machine
seen in Figure 3, was used by Nazi Germany in World War II [5].
This cipher technology was recently made famous by the movie “The Imitation
Game” [4]. The movie notes the brilliance of the Enigma cipher stating “There are
159 million, million, million possible Enigma settings. All we had to do was try each
one. But if we had 10 men checking one setting a minute for 24 hours every day and
seven days every week, how many days do you think it would take to check each of
the settings? Well, it’s not days; it’s years. It’s 20 million years. To stop an incoming
2
Figure 3. Enigma Machine
attack, we would have to check 20 million years worth of settings in 20 minutes” [4].
1.2 Cryptosystems and the one-time pad
Cryptosystems contain two basic components: an algorithm and one or more keys.
“The algorithm is the mathematical transformation used to encrypt and decrypt mes–
sages and the key(s) are parameters used in the encryption and decryption processes”
[5]. One such cryptographic algorithm is the one-time pad (OTP). Up until its in–
vention, by Gilbert Vernam in 1917, any cryptographic algorithm could theoretically
be decrypted given enough time and resources (e.g., computational resources, cipher
text, etc.) [6].
Kerchoff’s principle says that security of a cryptosystem relies on the security of
the key rather than the security of the algorithm [9]. The OTP is the only mathemat–
ically proven cryptographic algorithm to be unconditionally secure [7]. Unconditional
3
security means there is no way for an outside agent to intercept the encrypted mes–
sage without identifying his presence to both the receiving and send parties. It is
a secret-key cryptosystem where a randomly generated key(s), of equal size to the
message being sent, is used with the message to encrypt it; and then discarded after
use never to be reused again. In Cryptology it is common to refer to the party sending
the message as Alice, while the party receiving the message is referred to as Bob. [5].
The third unauthorized party, or eavesdropper, hereafter named Eve, must inter–
cept both the key and message. Further Eve must intercept the key without Alice or
Bob’s detection. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) provides a means to distribute a
key in a secure manner. To understand QKD we reference classic cryptology. As an
example, in older times one would have a unique wax seal used to seal messages en–
suring the recipient knows whether or not the message was intercepted. QKD applies
this concept to modern cryptology by exploiting the laws of quantum mechanics to
ensure the privacy of the key being distributed.
1.3 Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
QKD began with the idea of quantum coding introduced by Stephen Wiesner.
Quantum coding is the storage of information on polarized photons using conjugate
base pairs [10]. In 1984 a protocol called BB84 was created by Charles Bennett
and Gilles Brassard to use QKD [1]. The protocol requires connecting Alice and Bob
through both a classic public channel and quantum channel. To ensure security, QKD
leverages four concepts from quantum mechanics:
1. Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle states that the exact position, energy, and
time of two polarized photons cannot be measured at the same time.
2. Entanglement states physical properties of photons pairs are correlated.
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3. Schrödinger’s paradox states that observation of a quantum state collapses it.
4. No cloning theorem states perfectly cloning any unknown quantum state is
forbidden [9].
The BB84 uses these principles in four main steps:
1. Quantum Exchange,
2. Sifting,
3. Information Reconciliation, and
4. Privacy Amplification. [5]
Step 1 starts with Alice randomly generating a bit (0 or 1) to code onto a photon
and a conjugate basis to polarize the photon (rectilinear or diagonal). The rectilinear
basis uses 0 and 90 degree polarizations while the diagonal uses 45 and 135 degrees.
Alice then sends the encoded polarized photon to Bob. Bob guesses as to the basis
used. Assuming a perfect environment, if Bob correctly guesses the basis, he can
read the bit encoded onto the photon with 100% accuracy. If, however, Bob picked
the wrong basis we know from quantum mechanics that the data is destroyed and a
random bit value is measured resulting in a 50% probability the bit Bob measures
corresponds to the bit sent by Alice.
Step 2 consists of Bob sharing his random guesses for the basis using the classic
public channel, and Alice acknowledging which are correct [5]. The assumption that
Bob reads the bit from a correctly guessed basis with 100% accuracy means that,
theoretically, Alice and Bob should agree on the bit value for each correctly guessed
basis resulting in an identical subset of the original key.
Step 3 involves Bob revealing a subset of the measured bit values from the correctly
guessed basis over the public channel. Alice then confirms the values. Comparing
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values allow for calculation of an error rate. Errors can result due to environmental
noise, non-ideal equipment, and/or eavesdroppers. To meet the guaranteed security
requirement, it is assumed that all errors are due to the eavesdropping; however, a
practical preset error rate threshold can be set. So long as the error rate measured
falls below the threshold the process can continue. In this case, any errors that exist
are corrected using an information reconciliation protocol [5].
Step 4 limits Eve’s knowledge of the sifted key to a negligible amount by using a
random universal hash function from a publically known set of functions. The error
rate determined in the previous step and the sifted key are input into the function
and a final key is produced that is shortened based on how much knowledge Eve has
of the original sifted key. If an error threshold is exceeded, calling the security of the
key into question, then the entire process is discarded and Alice starts the process
over again with a new key.
1.4 QKD in practice
Limitations of a quantum environment exist and include: the inability of Alice to
code and emit one photon at a time, photons become damaged/corrupted/lost in the
channel between Alice and Bob, Bob’s inability to perfectly measure the photon with
his detectors, and imperfect basis alignment between Alice and Bob. This results in
errors in the sifted key despite the fact that an eavesdropper may not be present. To
counter this in practice, a threshold for accepting the sifted key is set by the users
based on the risk tolerance of the individuals and the importance of the messages
needing to be sent [5]. Further, if Eve is active enough to intercept a large portion of
the messages, her interception action would suppress communication between Alice
and Bob. It is thus assumed that Eve is a passive listener.
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1.5 Thesis Motivation
A detailed mathematical model of a wide range of QKD system configurations was
created by Cernera [2] based on a coupled set of equations. The model was validated
by comparing the output of the model to a few specific configurations found in liter–
ature [3]. This thesis aims to provide a mechanism for subject matter expert (SME)
validation over a wide set of parameters and ranges. Using response surface method–
ology a series of three dimensional graphs of the model are created and analyzed by
SME’s.
1.6 Overview
In chapter 2 the complexity of the existing model will be described using graphics
and equations as well as identify and describe the input and output variables. Chapter
3 first applies design of experiments to optimize memory allocation (a model input)
for the remainder of the analysis. Second a response surface is created for a wide
range of system configurations. The model produced is then graphed for use in SME
validation. Finally, the result of this surface characterization allows for use of a
genetic algorithm to estimate an optimal response for the model.
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II. Model Description
2.1 Model Source
The model examined was created by Cernera as part of a Master’s thesis at the
Air Force Institute of Technology and models a QKD system in terms of various
phases [2]. The intended purpose of the model is to allow for the study of critical
system parameters, to identify and demonstrate potential bottlenecks that affect the
total system runtime, which is the sum of time it takes to complete each phase, and
conduct analysis of system design trade-offs [2]. The message size was held constant
for the entirety of the study at 1Mbit allowing final key generation rate to be the
meassure of interest.
2.2 Model Description
The developed model is deterministic and provides a baseline model that can
encompass a wide range of QKD systems. Previously QKD was described as using
four separate phases [8]. This model uses eight phases to allow for a higher level of
detail as depicted in Figure 4. Each one of the eight phases in the model has its own
unique set of input and output variables. A list of these parameters is provided in
Table 4.
The user first specifies a set system parameters, and inputs for each of the eight
phases. The model provides an independent view of the system resource costs as
it relates to time, computational workload, and memory consumption. Cernera [2]
provides a complete description of the model.
The parameters of the model are listed in Table 1, along with a description.
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Figure 4. Phase Relationship: mapping the usual four phases in QKD to the eight used
in the model
2.3 Equations in Model
The current model is based on a coupled set of equations compiled by Cernerea [2]
as extracted from his thorough review of QKD models. The output variables unique
to each phase are listed in Table 4. A description of these variables can be seen in
Table 2 and 3. Equation coupling is high as many output variables for a specific
phase are inputs for other equations. This causes the model output response function
to be complex, motivating the use of experimentation and response surface modeling
to characterize the output response function.
All transmission times across the classical channel are calculated using Equation
1. Transmission time in seconds is a function of message size, bandwidth, the number
of transactions, and the propagation delay of the classical channel.
transmission time(msgsize, bandwidth, num trans) =
msgsize(bits)
bandwidth(Mbits/sec)
∗ num trans+ tclass prop delay(sec)
(1)
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Table 1. System characterization parameters
Component Parameter name Description (units)
dist btwn Alice Bob the distance between Alice and Bob (km)
Classical Channel delay per unit length The delay per kilometer incurred as a
result of propagation (sec/km)
bandwidth Information capacity of the classical channel (Mbits/sec)
Quantum Channel delay per unit length The delay per kilometer incurred as a
result of propagation (sec/km)
loss per km The average amount of loss, in dB,
experienced per kilometer (dB/km)
Alice pulse rate The pulse rate of Alice’s laser (Mhz)
MPN The Mean Photon Number (unitless)
signalpercent The percentage of signal states present in Alice’s transmission (%)
Alicetotal memory The total amount of memory allocated in Alice for QKD (bytes)
Alicecpu power The computational power of Alice’s classical processor (unit/sec)
Bob dB loss Bob The loss as a result of propagation through Bob (dB)
ηdetector The efficiency of Bob’s detectors (unitless)
tdead The dead time of Bob’s detectors (sec)
Bobtotal memory The total amount of memory allocated in Bob for QKD (bytes)
Bobcpu power The computational power of Bob’s classical processor (unit/sec)
Table 2. Model Input descriptions
Input variable name Description (units)
Desired Final Key Bits The number of final key bits (Mbit)
auth reservoirsize The number of bytes in the authentication reservoir
that can be used to authenticate a message (bytes)
auth key req The number of bytes required to authenticate a message (bytes)
AB avg msg size The average size of a message passed between Alice and Bob
that is sent from Alice (bytes)
BA avg msg size The average size of a message passed between Alice and Bob
that is sent from Bob (bytes)
AB num trans The number of transactions between Alice and Bob
that are initiated by Alice (unitless)
BA num trans The number of transactions between Alice and Bob
that are initiated by Bob (unitless)
mem req pulse The amount of memory required to store information on each pulse (bytes)
sifting eff frac The approximate ratio of detections to corrrect basis measurements,
as defined by the protocol (unitless)
bits sacrificed pct The percentage of the sifted key buffers sacrificed
to provide an error estimate (%)
num bits sacrficed The number of bits sacrificed for each Error Reconciliation routine (unitless)
blocksize The required input block size to perform an Error Reconciliation routine (bits)
pct entropy loss QBER The percentage of key lost due to entropy loss on the quantum channel (%)
pct entropy loss public The percentage of key lost due to entropy loss durring Error Reconciliation (%)
pct entropy loss multi photon The percentage of key lost due to multi-photon pulses (%)
pct entropy loss safety the percentage of key lost due to arbitrary safety margin (%)
min num req bits The minimum number of required bits necessary
to perfom Privacy Amplification (bits)
num auth reservoir bits The number of bitys reserved for the Authentication reservoir (bits)
10
Table 3. Model Output descriptions
Output variable name Description (units)
T Auth The time required to complete a single authentication (sec)
auth reservoir remainingsize The number of bytes remaining in the authentication reservoir (bytes)
TQE The time required to complete a single iteration of Quantum Exchange (sec)
A rawbuffer Ther size of Alice’s memory buffer after completion of QE (bytes)
B rawbuffer The size of Bob’s memory buffer after completion of QE (bytes)
Alice candidate key bits The number of bits Alice possesses at the end of QE with the potential
to be final key bits (bits)
Bob candidate key bits The number of bits Bob possesses at the end of QE with the portential
to be final key bits (bits)
Tsift The time required to complete the sifting process (sec)
B siftbuffer The size of Bob’s sifted key buffer (bytes)
A siftbuffer The size of Alice’s sifted key buffer (bytes)
TErrEst The time required to complete Error Estimation (sec)
A ErrEstbuffer The size of Alice’s Error Estimated key buffer (bytes)
B ErrEstbuffer The size of Bob’s Error Estimated key buffer (bytes)
TErrRec The total time required to complete a round of Error Reconciliation (sec)
A ErrRecbuffer The size of the Error Reconciled buffer (bytes)
B ErrRecbuffer The size of the Error Reconciled buffer (bytes)
num err rec The total number of Error Reconciliation routines required
to process the input buffer (unitless)
TEntEst the time required to complete Entropy Estimation (sec)
A EntEstbuffer The size of the Entropy Estimated buffer (bytes)
B EntEstbuffer the size of the Entropy Estimated buffer (bytes)
Nsecure The number of bits that can be saved after Privacy Amplification (bytes)
TPrivAmp The time required to complete Privacy Amplification (sec)
A PrivAmpbuffer The size of Alice’s Privacy Amplified buffer (bytes)
B PrivAmpbuffer The size of Bob’s Privacy Amplified buffer (bytes)
TFKG The time required to complete Final Key Generation (sec)
A FKGbuffer The size of Alice’s Final Key Generation buffer (bytes)
B FKGbuffer The size of Bob’s Final Key Generation buffer (bytes)
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Table 4. Model Input and Output
Phase Input variable name Output variable name
Desired vs Actual Performance Desired Final Key Bits
Authentication auth reservoirsize T Auth
auth key req auth reservoir remainingsize
AB avg msg size
BA avg msg size
AB num trans
BA num trans
Quantum Exchange mem req pulse TQE
A rawbuffer
B rawbuffer
Alice candidate key bits
Bob candidate key bits
Sifting sifting eff frac Tsift
AB avg msg size B siftbuffer
BA avg msg size A siftbuffer
AB num trans
BA num trans
Error Estimation bits sacrificed pct TErrEst
AB avg msg size A ErrEstbuffer
BA avg msg size B ErrEstbuffer
AB num trans
BA num trans
Error Reconciliation num bits sacrficed TErrRec
block size A ErrRecbuffer
AB avg msg size B ErrRecbuffer
BA avg msg size num err rec
AB num trans
BA num trans
Entropy Estimation pct entropy loss QBER TEntEst
pct entropy loss public A EntEstbuffer
pct entropy loss multi photon B EntEstbuffer
pct entropy loss safety Nsecure
AB avg msg size
BA avg msg size
AB num trans
BA num trans
Privacy Amplification min num req bits TPrivAmp
AB avg msg size A PrivAmpbuffer
BA avg msg size B PrivAmpbuffer
AB num trans
BA num trans
Final Key Generation num auth reservoir bits TFKG
AB avg msg size A FKGbuffer
BA avg msg size B FKGbuffer
AB num trans
BA num trans
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Equation 2 calculates the total number of pulses that Alice sends as a function of
the amount of memory allocated to Quantum Exchange, and the amount of memory
required to send a pulse.
num pulses sent =
Amem avail
mem req per pulse
(2)
Equation 3 calculates the number of detections that will actually be received by
Bob as a function of efficiencies of the channel and Bob’s hardware, the probability
that a pulse contains a photon(s), the chosen signal percentage, and the total number
of pulses sent by Alice.
num det at Bob = num pulses sent∗Pois(X ≥ 1)∗sigpercent∗ηchannel∗ηBob∗ηdet (3)
Equation 4 calculates the total amount of time (in seconds) required for a single
authentication as a function of time it takes to transmit data between Alice and Bob
and the time required to perform computations.
TAuth =
transmission time(avg msg size{AB,BA}, bandwidth, num trans(AB,BA))+
{A,B}workloadAuth
{A,B}cpupower
(4)
Equation 5 calculates the amount of authentication key (in bytes) remaining in
the authentication reservoir after the phase has completed execution as a function of
the number of bytes in the authentication reservoir that can be used to authenticate
a message and the number of bytes required to authenticate a message.
auth reservoir remainingsize = (auth reservoirsize − auth key required) (5)
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Equation 6 calculates the time (in seconds) required to complete a single iteration
of Quantum Exchange (QE) as a function of either the total time it takes for Alice
to transmit all pulses required to fill her memory or the amount of time it takes to
complete the classical processing necessary to process the information associated with
each pulse, whichever takes longer.
TQE = max(
num det at Bob
actual det rate
+ tquant prop delay,
{A,B}workloadQE
{A,B}cpupower
) (6)
Given that Alice and Bob must store information about each pulse during QE,
Equation 7 and Equation 8 calculate the size (in bytes) of the raw memory buffers
after completion of QE for Alice and Bob, respectively as a function of the number of
pulses sent (Alice) and detections (Bob) times the memory required for each pulse.
Arawbuffer = num pulses sent ∗mem req pulse (7)
Brawbuffer = num det at Bob ∗mem req pulse (8)
Equation 9 and Equation 10 calculate the number of candidate bits at the end of
QE (i.e., bits that have the potential to become final key bits) as a function of the
number of pulses sent (Alice) and detections (Bob), respectively.
AQE candidate key bits = num pulses sent =
Amem avail
mem req per pulse
(9)
BQE candidate key bits = num det at Bob =
num pulses sent ∗ Pois(X ≥ 1) ∗ sigpercent ∗ ηchannel ∗ ηBob ∗ ηdet
(10)
Equation 11 calculates the time (in seconds) required to complete the sifting pro–
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cess as a function of the time it takes to transmit required data across the classical
channel and the computational time required.
TSift =
transmission time(avg msg size{AB,BA}, bandwidth, num trans{AB,BA})+
{A,B}workloadSift
{A,B}cpupower
(11)
Equation 12 calculates the size of Alice and Bob’s sifted key buffer (in bytes)
and is the result of removing both the unnecessary information about each pulse and
mismatched basis measurements between Bob and Alice.
Asiftbuffer = Bsiftbuffer = sift eff frac ∗
Brawbuffer
mem req pulse
(12)
Equation 13 calculates the time (in seconds) required to complete Error Estimation
as a function of the time it takes to transmit required data across the classical channel
and the computational time required.
TErrEst =
transmissiontime(avg msg size{AB,BA}, bandwidth, num trans{AB,BA}+
{A,B}workloadErrEst
{A,B}cpupower
(13)
Equation 14 and Equation 15 calculate the size of Alice and Bob’s error estimated
key buffer (in bytes), respectively as a function of percentage of bits that are saved
multiplied by the size of the sifted key buffer.
AErrEstbuffer = (1− bits sacrificedpct) ∗ ASiftbuffer (14)
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BErrEstbuffer = (1− bits sacrificedpct) ∗BSiftbuffer (15)
Equation 16 calculates the total time (in seconds) required to complete a round
of Error Reconciliation as a function of the time it takes to complete a single block
of input key multiplied by the number of total blocks in the error estimated input
buffer. If the number of blocks do not divide the error estimated buffer evenly, the
last block is padded in order for the algorithm to run successfully.
TErrRec = ceil(
{A,B}ErrEstbuffer
blocksize
)∗
(transmission time(avg msg size{AB,BA}, bandwidth, num trans{AB,BA})+
{A,B}workloadErrRec
{A,B}cpupower
)
(16)
Equation 17 and Equation 18 calculate the size of the error reconciled buffer (in
bytes) as a function of size of the error estimated buffer and the number of bits
sacrificed during all iterations of the algorithm (if any).
AEntEstbuffer = AErrRecbuffer =
AErrEstbuffer − (num bits sacrificed ∗ num err rec)
(17)
BEntEstbuffer = BErrRecbuffer =
BErrEstbuffer − (num bits sacrificed ∗ num err rec)
(18)
Equation 19 calculates the total number of error reconciliation iterations as a
function of the number of blocks contained in the error estimated buffer.
num err rec = ceil(
{A,B}ErrEstbuffer
blocksize
) (19)
Equation 20 calculates the time required to complete Entropy Estimation in sec–
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onds as a function of the time it takes to transmit required data across the classical
channel and the computational time required.
TEntEst =
transmission time(avg msg size{AB,BA}, bandwidth, num trans{AB,BA})+
{A,B}workloadEntEst
{A,B}cpupower
(20)
Equation 21 calculates the number of bits that can be saved during the upcoming
Privacy Amplification phase as a function of the percentage of the key remaining after
losses and the size of the error reconciled buffer.
Nsecure = (1− total ent loss pct) ∗ {A,B}ErrRecbuffer (21)
Equation 22 calculates the time (in seconds) required to complete Privacy Am–
plification as a function of time it takes to transmit required data across the classical
channel and the computational time required.
TPrivAmp =
transmission time(avg msg size{AB,BA}, bandwidth, num trans{AB,BA})+
{A,B}workloadPrivAmp
{A,B}cpupower
(22)
Equation 23 shows the size (in bytes) of the privacy amplified buffer is equal to
the number of bytes that can be saved as a result of entropy estimation.
APrivAmpbuffer = BPrivAmpbuffer = Nsecure =
(1− total ent loss pct) ∗ {A,B}ErrRecbuffer
(23)
Equation 24 calculates the time (in seconds) required to complete Final Key Gen–
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eration as a function of the time it takes to transmit required data across the classical
channel and the computational time required.
TFKG =
transmission time(avg msg size{AB,BA}, bandwidth, num trans{AB,BA})+
{A,B}workloadFKG
{A,B}cpupower
(24)
Equation 25 and Equation 26 calculate the size (in bytes) of the final key buffer
for Alice and Bob, respectively, as a function of the size of the privacy amplified buffer
and the need to reserve bits for the authentication reservoir.
AFKGbuffer = APrivAmpbuffer − num auth reservoir bits (25)
BFKGbuffer = BPrivAmpbuffer − num auth reservoir bits (26)
2.4 Implementation
Equations 1 to 26 are coupled together and implemented using Excel functions
and Excel VBA. The model is split into two sheets. The first sheet, shown in Figure
13 contains inputs for all high-level system parameters.
All equations are confirmed to be accurately coded into the model. If the inputs
contain a problem that must be corrected the cells will turn red to signify that.
Green signifies a valid configuration. The second sheet contains the mathematical
description in an Input - Output style, subdivided by the eight phases and can be
seen in Figures 14 to 20.
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III. Response Surface of Model Output
3.1 Overview
We are interested in characterizing the quantum key distribution model output.
Given the highly coupled nature of the model, the output response is hypothesized
as quite complex, likely highly nonlinear. We employ response surface methods to
accomplish the characterization. We consider the model a “blackbox”, present inputs,
and collect outputs. Inputs are listed and described in Table 5. Three outputs are
collected: the number of bits in the final key, the final rate of bits processed measured
in bits/sec, and total system runtime. The first two outputs matter only in terms
of identifying the third, the time it will take to complete the entire quantum key
exchange. Each phase takes a certain number of iterations to complete the QKD
process. The total time is calculated by determining the amount of time it takes to
complete an iteration, times the number of iterations added for each of the phases.
The limiting factor is the time it takes to complete the process and is used as the only
response variable for the purpose of the study. The desired final key bits is expected
to overshadow other variables and is known to greatly affect the response. To gain a
deeper understanding of the model the message size was held constant for the entirety
of the study at 1Mbit.
The first objective of the study is to determine an optimal setting of memory
allocation while holding all other variables constant. The second is to characterize
the relationship of the remaining inputs as related to the output. The third objective
is to apply a heuristic search method to the response function to locate optimal
settings to the QKD model.
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Table 5. Factors and Response
Inputs/Factors Description
Aauth Percent memory allocation assigned to Authentication for Alice
AQE Percent memory allocation assigned to Quantum Exchange for Alice
Asift Percent memory allocation assigned to Sifting for Alice
AErrEst Percent memory allocation assigned to Error Estimation for Alice
AErrRec Percent memory allocation assigned to Error Reconciliation for Alice
Aent Percent memory allocation assigned to Entropy Estimation for Alice
AprivAmp Percent memory allocation assigned to Privacy Amplification for Alice
AFKG Percent memory allocation assigned to Final Key Generation for Alice
Bauth Percent memory allocation assigned to Authentication for Bob
BQE Percent memory allocation assigned to Quantum Exchange for Bob
Bsift Percent memory allocation assigned to Sifting for Bob
BErrEst Percent memory allocation assigned to Error Estimation for Bob
BErrRec Percent memory allocation assigned to Error Reconciliation for Bob
Bent Percent memory allocation assigned to Entropy Estimation for Bob
BprivAmp Percent memory allocation assigned to Privacy Amplification for Bob
BFKG Percent memory allocation assigned to Final Key Generation for Bob
dist The distance between Alice and Bob,
designated in model: dist btwn Alice Bob
loss The average amount of loss, in dB, experienced per kilometer,
designated in model: loss per km
MPN The Mean Photon Number
signal The percentage of signal states present in Alice’s transmission,
designated in model: signalpercent
etadetect The effeciency of Bob’s detectors, designated in model: ηdetector
tdead The dead time of Bob’s detectors, designated in model: tdead
Amem The total amount of memory allocated to Alice for QKD,
designated in model: Alicetotal memory
Bmem The total amount of memory allocated to Bob for QKD,
designated in model: Bobtotal memory
Output/Response
Runtime Amount of time it take to complete the QKD process,
designated in model: Total System Runtime
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3.2 Statistical Methods
Characterizing the relationship between the inputs and outputs is of interest.
We apply mathematical and statistical methods to understand the nature of the
relationship. We call the inputs to the “black box” factors and the output a response,
y.
In general a response y of interest is influenced by several input variables, or
factors, that are controlled to levels specified by an experimental design. The response
is a function of n factors plus some uncontrollable noise or error term assumed to
follow a normal distribution centered at zero with constant variance; this is seen in
Equation 27.
y = f(x1, x2, ...xn) + ε (27)
However, because this is a deterministic computer model, there is no variability in
the model. Denoting the expected response by E(y) = f(x1, x2, ..., xn) = η the surface
represented by η = f(x1, x2, ..., xn) is called a response surface. This response surface
characterizes the relationship between the factors and the response. The model that
relates the response to the factors is estimated using least-squares multiple linear
regression methods. All factors in Table 5 are continuous except for the total amount
of memory allocated to Alice and Bob for QKD. Memory is inherently discrete and is
determined by 2z, where z is an integer. When a design is chosen to collect the data
the variables in the natural space are converted into a coded space where all factors
range from -1 to 1.
Although there is no random error in our sampling, the resulting analysis does
contain an error component which is generally called the lack of fit (LOF) component.
The LOF component represents all potential model terms excluded from the model.
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Exclusion of a parameter assumes the parameter is insignificant and therefore equal
to zero, and the estimate is noise. The LOF component is used to assess parameter
significance in subsequent analyses.
3.3 Memory allocation: screening phase
The lack of variability in the black box model removes the need for replications.
The study began with the desire to screen the variables designated to memory allo–
cation for each of the eight phases for both Alice and Bob. The allocation of memory
is defined as a percentage of the total memory. For Alice and Bob the sum of the
percentage of memory allocated across each of the eight phases cannot exceed 100%
of the memory available. Percentages are nonnegative and each phase must have a
nonzero percentage to complete. Defining an appropriate range of values for each
factor is important to ensure proper memory allocation. The high level was set to
12% and the low level was set to 5%.
The relationship between the memory allocation and the response is unknown;
however, knowledge of the model leads to a hypothesis that in addition to main
effects, factor interactions between phases may be significant, especially given the
level of coupling among the model equations. Selecting a design that identifies the
main effects and two-level interactions for the 16 factors resulted in 144 runs.
The data was fit to a first order model with two-level interactions and statisti–
cally significant parameters were identified. A list of significant parameters sorted
according to significance are shown in Figure 5.
The only significant parameter identified was AQE, the memory allocation as–
signed to Alice for quantum exchange. The distribution of responses is seen in Figure
6 and shows the negligible effect of all factors except for the significant parameter
already identified. This results in Figure 6 having only three points, one point for
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Figure 5. Sorted parameters for memory allocation
each level of the parameter identified (low or -1, middle or 0, high or 1)
Figure 6. Memory allocation response distribution
After observing a single significant factor for memory allocation all nonsignificant
factors for Alice’s memory allocation were set to the low level of 5% to allow for a
larger exploratory range in the significant factor for the remainder of the analysis.
Factors for Bob’s memory allocation remain at the midpoint.
3.4 Response Surface Equation
The next step is to characterize the relationship of the remaining factors found
in Table 5 in relation to the response. The levels for the factors are in Table 6. The
default settings are used as the center point of the design space.
Bob’s memory allocation did not effect the response time. It is reasonable then
to assume that the total memory available to Bob is insignificant over the range of
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Table 6. Factors Levels
Factors (units) Low level (-1) High level (1)
AQE(%) 0.05 0.35
dist (km) 14 32
loss (dB/km) 0.1 0.3
MPN 0.5 0.7
signal (%) 0.6 0.9
etadetect 0.05 0.15
tdead (µs) 15 25
Amem (GB) 2 16
memory considered. A quick screening test was run using all values in Table 6 that
confirmed this hypothesis as well as ensure all remaining effects significantly explain
variability in the response in some way. Therefore Bmem is removed as a factor in
the response surface model.
Since the model response is expected to be complex no model form is assumed a
priori. The existence of discrete variables limits the use of some space filling designs,
so a grid approach was used. The size of the grid determines the largest order of a
model that can be estimated. A grid size of five levels in the seven continuous factors
based on a step size of 0.5 was selected. Practically it was determined that the values
for memory were 2, 4, 8, 16 based on current industry values for available memory.
This grid permits estimation of up to a fourth order response surface model. This
yielded 312,500 design points which provide a high enough resolution for the purpose
of identifying a response surface. The grid was centered on the default settings. The
resulting ANOVA is in Figure 7, while the actual model parameters are in Figure 8
through 11.
The model includes the significant parameters, those with an α value less than
0.05. The model contains polynomials to the third degree in all variables except the
percentage of signal states present in Alice’s transmission (signal) which is quadratic,
and the dead time of Bob’s detectors (tdead) which is linear. Interaction terms contain
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Figure 7. ANOVA from Grid design
up to six variables in all variables except tdead. Significant interactions with tdead are
those between both the average amount of loss, in dB, experienced per km (loss) and
the efficiency of Bob’s detectors (etadetect), and the interaction between all three.
The coupling of equations results in a complex response surface. Figure 26 shows
a three dimensional representation of the response surface in the percent memory al–
located to quantum exchange (AQE) and the effeciency of Bob’s detectors (etadetect).
However, while the interactions are significant and included in the model, Figure 47
shows that the response is primarily linear in terms of the dead time of Bob’s detectors
(tdead). A complete set of three dimensional graphs are found in the appendix.
3.5 Response Surface Optimization
The estimated response function was optimized using a Genetic Algorithm (GA).
A GA is a search procedure inspired by natural selection. Solutions to problems are
considered members of a population. Each specific population member is an encoded
solution (set of input values) for the model. Each member, solution, has associated
with it a value equating to the strength of that member; we use the objective function
value as the strength value. We then provide a biased reproduction process where
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Figure 8. Parameter values part 1
the ability of a members value to reproduce is dependent upon the members’ fitness.
Starting with a population of solutions, better solutions create more influence on
future solutions. Over a number of generations the evolution process ideally yields
an optimal solution from within the population.
The response function obtained is optimized using Matlab’s genetic algorithm
function “ga”. The inputs to the function are
1. Objective function,
2. Number of variables,
3. Upper and Lower bounds on each variable, and
4. Integer Constraints where applicable.
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Figure 9. Parameter values part 2
The objective function is the regression model from Figure 8 to Figure 11, with
minor modifications to account for the discrete variable Amem. The values Amem
can take on are 2,4,8,16. A simple transformation is made from Amem to Amemtrans
using the relationship seen in Equation 28. Applying a lower bound of 1 and an
upper bound of 4 in addition to an Integer constraint on the transformed variable
Amemtrans ensures the optimized solution found using GA uses one of the required
discrete values in Amem.
Amem = 2Amemtrans (28)
After the transformation of Amem remaining variables and bounds are listed in
Table 6. The estimated optimal settings obtained using the GA are seen in Table 7.
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Figure 10. Parameter values part 3
Applying these settings to the Excel model results in a response value of 7749.082661.
3.6 SME Validation Method
The response surface characterizes model performance. Subject matter expert
(SME) input is employed to determine if the results obtained using the response
surface makes sense. The variables expected to have positive first order correlation
(that is as the value for the variables increase the response is expected to increase) are
dist, loss, tdead and Amem. The remaining variables (AQE, MPN, signal, etadetect)
all are expected to produce negative first order effects. Figure 8 confirms the accurate
signs for the first order effects in the model for all variables.
Observation of the surfaces in Figures 22 through 49 reveal unexpected behavior
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Figure 11. Parameter values part 4
of the response due to higher order effects. In example Figure 29 shows the marginal
effect of dist and loss on the response variable. The expectation here is that as
both dist and loss increase so should the runtime. Figure 29 shows opposite behavior.
Further, the settings expected by SMEs to produce an optimal point results in a value
of 68,422 seconds indicating the existence of extreme outlier points in unexpected
locations.
3.7 Data distribution
The distribution of Runtime can be seen in Figure 12. Roughly 80% settings
produce Runtimes in hundreds as expected; however, the right tail of the distribution
is very thick indicating the existence of extreme outliers that effect the model.
Figures 55 through 82 overlay the actual observed data points on the surface
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Table 7. Optimal Settings
Factors Setting (coded space) Setting (natural space)
AQE 1 35 %
dist 1 32 km
loss -1 0.1 dB/km
MPN 1 0.7
signal 1 90 %
etadetect 1 0.15
tdead 1 25 µs
Amem 0.5 8 GB
Figure 12. Response variable distribution
profiles. The large amount of data points create a practically significant amount of
noise that make it difficult to observe a clear pattern in many figures.
3.8 Residual Analysis to understand data distribution
The thick right tail largely consist of outlier, or influential data points. To identify
these points in the data we take the absolute value of the studentized residuals for
each observation. Typically any value larger than three is considered to be an outlier.
As seen in Table 8 using a residual value threshold results in 5655 outliers. Using this
residual value threshold there are data points in both the left and the right tail. To
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Table 8. Outlier Analysis
Residual Value Number of Noticable pattern
Threshold Outliers
3 5655 no data points remain where AQE is equal to 12.5%
4 2957 values for etadetect are non-negative in coded space (≥ 10)
5 1702 values for AQE are non-negative in coded space (≥ 20%)
6 967 AQE is positive in coded space (≥ 27.5%),
no data points remain where Alice’s memory equals 4 GB
7 639 values for etadetect are positive in coded space (≥ 12.5)
8 433 no data points remain where Alice’s memory equals 2 GB
9 337 no data points remain where loss is equal to 0.25 dB/km
Alice’s memory equals 16 GB for all remaining points
10 247 values for loss are all negative in coded space (≤ 0.15)
11 179 AQE equals 35% for all remaining points
no data points remain where signal equals 60%
12 133 no new pattern noticable
13 100 values for dist are non-positive in coded space (≤ 23km)
values for signal are non-negative in coded space (≥ 75%)
14 75 etadetect equals 0.15 for all remaining points
15 45 loss equals 0.1 dB/km
isolate only those points in the right tail we raise the residual value threshold to four,
resulting in 2957 data points. To help characterize and identify the similarities in the
outliers we systematically raise the residual value threshold and observe noticeable
patterns. The complete results are seen in Table 8.
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IV. Conclussions
4.1 Summary and Conclusion
The study verified the correct coding of equations 1 through 26 into the QKD
model. The analysis began with a screening experiment to determine the significant
memory allocation factors for both Alice and Bob. The significant parameters from
the screening experiment combined with the system level parameters seen in Table 6
were used to create a mathematical 138 parameter metamodel used to plot response
surfaces used for SME validation. The response surfaces revealed unexpected behavior
and the identification of extreme points which lead to an analysis of the distribution
of the data and outlier analysis. Overlaying the actual data points on the surface
profiles seen in Figures 55 through 82 indicate an immensely complicated surface,
difficult to model.
The model was validated for data points surrounding initial settings provided by
Cernera [2]; however, extreme points were observed specifically when Alice’s memory
was large (16 GB) and the memory allocated to Quantum Exchange for Alice was
large (35%). The settings indicate an edge of the intended design range for the QKD
model.
4.2 Future Analysis
Three approaches are recommended for future research. First: After initial screen–
ing of memory allocation to each of the eight phases for both Alice and Bob the pa–
rameters were removed from the study. A look into the relevance of the parameters
at a lower percent of memory allocation will likely show significant effect on the Run–
time. Second: Transforming the response variable would allow for an examination of
other surfaces that may be more fitting for the model. Third: Phase specific inputs
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went unexplored in this study. A study involving these inputs and the outputs for
each phase may lead to identification of which phase is causing bottlenecks creating
large Runtimes.
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Appendix A. Excel Model
Figure 13. Implementation of model using Excel
34
Figure 14. Implementation of model: Authentication Phase
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Figure 15. Implementation of model: Quantum Exchange
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Figure 16. Implementation of model: Sifting
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Figure 17. Implementation of model: Error Estimation
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Figure 18. Implementation of model: Error Reconciliation
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Figure 19. Implementation of model: Entropy Estimation
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Figure 20. Implementation of model: Privacy Amplification
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Figure 21. Implementation of model: Final Key Generation
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Appendix B. Surface profiles
Graphics for all combinations of two variables in a 3D plot can be seen below:
Figure 22. Surface profile of AQE vs. dist
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Figure 23. Surface profile of AQE vs. loss
Figure 24. Surface profile of AQE vs. MPN
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Figure 25. Surface profile of AQE vs. signal
Figure 26. Surface profile of AQE vs. etadetect
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Figure 27. Surface profile of AQE vs. tdead
Figure 28. Surface profile of AQE vs. Amem
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Figure 29. Surface profile of dist vs. loss
Figure 30. Surface profile of dist vs. MPN
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Figure 31. Surface profile of dist vs. signal
Figure 32. Surface profile of dist vs. etadetect
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Figure 33. Surface profile of dist vs. tdead
Figure 34. Surface profile of dist vs. Amem
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Figure 35. Surface profile loss vs. MPN
Figure 36. Surface profile of loss vs. signal
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Figure 37. Surface profile of loss vs. etadetect
Figure 38. Surface profile of loss vs. tdead
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Figure 39. Surface profile of loss vs. Amem
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Figure 40. Surface profile of MPN vs. signal
Figure 41. Surface profile of MPN vs. etadetect
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Figure 42. Surface profile of MPN vs. tdead
Figure 43. Surface profile of MPN vs. Amem
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Figure 44. Surface profile of signal vs. etadetect
Figure 45. Surface profile of signal vs. tdead
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Figure 46. Surface profile of signal vs. Amem
Figure 47. Surface profile of etadetect vs. tdead
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Figure 48. Surface profile of etadetect vs. Amem
Figure 49. Surface profile of tdead vs. Amem
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Appendix C. Residual plots
Residual analysis is conducted using the studentized residuals and can be seen in
Figure 50 through Figure 54.
Figure 50. Residuals vs. Predicted
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Figure 51. Residual distribution for AQE and dist
Figure 52. Residual distribution for loss and MPN
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Figure 53. Residual distribution for signal and etadetect
Figure 54. Residual distribution for tdead and Amem
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Appendix D. Data overlay on Surfaces
Surface profiles with actual observed data points overlayed on surface:
Figure 55. Surface profile of AQE vs. dist with actual
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Figure 56. Surface profile of AQE vs. loss with actual
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Figure 57. Surface profile of AQE Vs. MPN with actual
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Figure 58. Surface profile of AQE vs. signal with actual
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Figure 59. Surface profile of AQE vs. etadetect with actual
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Figure 60. Surface profile of AQE vs. tdead with actual
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Figure 61. Surface profile of AQE vs. Amem with actual
67
Figure 62. Surface profile of dist vs. loss with actual
68
Figure 63. Surface profile of dist vs. MPN with actual
69
Figure 64. Surface profile of dist vs. signal with actual
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Figure 65. Surface profile of dist vs. etadetect with actual
71
Figure 66. Surface profile of dist vs. tdead with actual
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Figure 67. Surface profile of dist vs. Amem with actual
73
Figure 68. Surface profile loss vs. MPN with actual
74
Figure 69. Surface profile of loss vs. signal with actual
75
Figure 70. Surface profile of loss vs. etadetect with actual
76
Figure 71. Surface profile of loss vs. tdead with actual
77
Figure 72. Surface profile of loss vs. Amem with actual
78
Figure 73. Surface profile of MPN vs. signal with actual
79
Figure 74. Surface profile of MPN vs. etadetect with actual
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Figure 75. Surface profile of MPN vs. tdead with actual
81
Figure 76. Surface profile of MPN vs. Amem with actual
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Figure 77. Surface profile of signal vs. etadetect with actual
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Figure 78. Surface profile of signal vs. tdead with actual
84
Figure 79. Surface profile of signal vs. Amem with actual
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Figure 80. Surface profile of etadetect vs. tdead with actual
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Figure 81. Surface profile of etadetect vs. Amem with actual
87
Figure 82. Surface profile of tdead vs. Amem with actual
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